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6 February 1964

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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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DIA and DOS review(s)  
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### DAILY BRIEF

\*Cyprus: [While Greek Cypriot leaders are apparently deeply concerned over the 4 February bombing of the US Embassy in Nicosia, there has been no easing of the local situation.]

[The minister of interior, following discussion with President Makarios, told Ambassador Wilkins that every possible measure would be taken to insure the safety of American lives and property.]

[Makarios, meanwhile, reportedly rejected on 3 February an earlier offer by George Grivas, former leader of the underground organization EOKA, to return to Cyprus to assume covert command of a unified Greek Cypriot military effort. Makarios probably sees him as a potential threat to his own leadership.]

[Grivas, who lives in Athens, has long been critical of Makarios. He has [ ] denounced the Archbishop's mishandling of the Cyprus problem, particularly his treatment of the Anglo-American proposals for sending an international force to Cyprus. Grivas opposes taking the issue to the UN, fearing that the USSR will be able to use the Cyprus problem to the detriment of NATO.]

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[In Greece, the US Ambassador states that it is hard to convey the depth of popular feeling against the Turks which now prevails. The US Army Attaché has recently reported a similar attitude toward Turkey among the Greek military. Fear that the United States may support Turkey in future negotiations or other action in relation to Cyprus has led to a bitter press campaign against US policy on the part of virtually all newspapers in Athens.]

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Panama: [Communist party leaders claim to be successfully exploiting the current unrest in Panama in order to divide the ruling groups and advance the prospects of revolution]

[After years of ineffective action under an incompetent leadership, the small Panamanian Communist party (PdP) has increased its size and effectiveness over the past 18 months. This improvement is in part attributable to its effort to meet competition from the Castro-supported Vanguard of Revolutionary Action (VAN).]

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[As late as last November, the PdP leadership rejected pressure from Castro to combine plans for revolutionary effort with the VAN. Cooperation begun between agitators of the PdP and VAN during the 9-10 January violence, however, evidently is being continued in student and propaganda efforts to maintain anti-US nationalistic fever at a high level]

[A PdP leader is reported to believe that continued pressure on President Chiari to remain adamant toward the US may make Panama's elite turn against the government, thus creating a chaotic situation in which a revolution might succeed. In order to take advantage of such a development, he urged individual PdP members to obtain arms promptly rather than to expect them from abroad.]

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Brazil: Officials of the subsidiary of the American and Foreign Power Company (Amforp) in the state of Rio Grande do Norte fear imminent expropriation by Governor Alves.

The company has been the target of a growing nationalist campaign that is threatening to expand into a general strike in the state capital of Natal. The governor's newspaper has indicated that the state will "solve the problem" unless President Goulart steps in immediately.

Negotiations between the federal government and Amforp regarding nationalization of all the company's Brazilian subsidiaries have been bogged down for several months because of the government's delay in taking inventory of the company assets.

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Ghana: [The US Embassy in Accra believes that the possibility of an early coup attempt by the army has increased significantly over the past month, although it still does not believe that such an attempt is probable.]

[If a coup is tried, the embassy believes it would have a high probability of success.]

[Ghana's Western-trained and essentially apolitical officer corps has become increasingly disturbed by Nkrumah's recent leftward evolution. Circumstances now suggest that the time is ripe for action by Brigadier Ankrah, the deputy chief of Ghana's Defense Staff.]

[Ankrah's popularity within the army and among the general populace in the Accra area appears to have soared in recent days. It is widely believed that Ankrah has taken issue with Nkrumah over the President's refusal to permit a proper military burial for a soldier killed under mysterious circumstances at Nkrumah's residence last month.]

[Moreover, there now are indications that Ankrah may be in a position to control certain key military elements in the Accra area, even though he has no tactical troops under his command. The brigadier commanding most army personnel in Accra has been maintaining conspicuously close contact with Ankrah recently and may be taking instructions from him. The US Army Attaché is convinced that the bulk of Ghana's 9,000-man army would follow Ankrah without question.]

[Rumors regarding Ankrah, who has long been under suspicion, have probably reached Nkrumah. The President, however, may feel that he cannot]



now move against him because of strong support among Ankrah's fellow Ga tribesmen, who predominate in the Accra area, as well as within the military.

Chances of action by Ankrah will probably turn on whether he becomes convinced that he faces a now-or-never situation. Although he has generally appeared disinclined to mix in politics, he has in the past been reported as harboring political ambitions and seeing himself as something of a "man of destiny."

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Japan - Communist China: [A Japanese airline plans to seek government approval of nonscheduled air service between Japan and Communist China.]

[Kaheita Okazaki, the president of All Nippon Airways, has long cherished plans for flights between southwest Japan and Shanghai. He probably believes that French recognition of Peiping makes the Japanese Government more likely to allow closer contacts with the mainland.]

[He wishes to arrange a special flight next month to bring the chairman of Peiping's International Trade Promotion Commission and other "important people" to Japan.]

[Peiping has encouraged Okazaki to believe that prospects for a Japan-China air link are good, apparently as part of a continuing effort to stimulate domestic pressures on Tokyo for a "normalization" of relations with Peiping. The Chinese have steadily increased their overtures to Japanese business interests ever since the conclusion of the unofficial 1962 trade agreement.]

[Official Japanese approval may not be forthcoming at this time in view of Japan's desire not to place further strains on her relations with Nationalist China.]

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NOTES

British Guiana: [Elements of Jagan's People's Progressive Party (PPP) probably intend to foment violence during their current "freedom march" to Georgetown with the idea of getting publicity abroad and consolidating wavering domestic support. The UN consul general believes Jagan may not be committed to this course. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] speculates that Cuba's trade representative in Georgetown or the Jamaican Communist who recently became editor of the PPP newspaper might be behind the PPP's increasingly aggressive strategy. [REDACTED]

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Peru: Communist-directed peasant violence has increased in recent weeks in scattered areas of the Department of Cuzco despite claims by President Belaunde that his government has the Communists in Peru under control. In a series of recent armed clashes between peasants and the national police there were a number of casualties on both sides. Constitutional guarantees in the department have been suspended and the government has dispatched police reinforcements to the area.

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